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RESUMEN 
 
El presente documento estudia el reto estratégico que la amenaza terrorista supone para las 
empresas, analizando la manera en la que este riesgo puede ser imbricado en la gestión estratégica 
general de las compañías. Primeramente estudiamos esta cuestión desde un punto de vista teórico, 
analizando alternativamente el riesgo que el terrorismo supone para la actividad empresarial y el 
diseño de supuestos de gestión de crisis derivados de esta amenaza. En segundo lugar, 
completamos el anterior análisis teórico, estudiando en profundidad las medidas adoptadas por el 
sector del transporte ferroviario alemán a este respecto, partiendo de un amplio conjunto de 
entrevistas de expertos realizadas con los responsables de la gestión estratégica de estas 
compañías. Los resultados de este análisis empírico vienen a confirmar plenamente nuestros 
planteamientos teóricos. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The present paper studies the strategic challenge that the terrorist threat represents to business, 
analyzing the procedure by which this risk could be efficiently embedded into a firm´s general 
strategic management. This is done firstly from a theoretical point of view, analyzing how firms 
should deal with the risk of a terrorist attack. This is achieved through the integration of crisis 
management into a company´s strategic management. We complement this with an empirical 
analysis consisting of expertinterviews to the leading firms of the German railway industry. These 
results underpin our theoretical framework. 
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 1 Introduction 
1.1 Terrorism as a business threat 
“Terrorism will continue to be an issue for German companies at least for the next 100 
years.”1 This recent statement prominently depicts the persistent relevance of the terrorist 
threat to the business community – German as well as international. Surely, the attacks of 
September 11, 2001 (hereafter 9/11) have thrust this matter into the global spotlight. The 
evolving events post 9/11 such as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have kept the modern 
Islamist terror issue on the agenda for political actors, the media and the public as well. 
Further fatal attacks followed in subsequent years to 9/11, for instance, in Djerba, Bali, 
Madrid, London and Mumbai, to name some of the most familiar ones. Failed terror plots also 
raised concern in society about matters such as security questions and preparedness in case of 
attacks. Failed plots in more recent years include a car bomb that was found in 2010 in Times 
Square, New York, the foiled attempt to detonate underwear explosives on a flight to Detroit 
in 2009, or the recent attempt to explode a car bomb outside the FED building in Mahattan. 
The years of 2006 and 2007 mark the failed ‘Kofferbomber’ attack in Germany as well as the 
arrests of the so-called ‘Sauerland-Gruppe’ terror cell. 
Figure 1: Worldwide Terrorist Incidents. Source: Own Illustration.2 
1 Quote from a ‘Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz’ member at an IHK meeting. 
2 Based on data from National Counterterrorism Center - Worldwide Incidents Tracking System 
(https://wits.nctc.gov). Non-combatants only. 
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The threat and scope of terrorism in recent years continue to be of concern, as the figure 
below demonstrates. Even though the bloodiest peak seems to lie in the past, the last year has 
seen a slight increase at a still high level viewed in absolute terms. 
One might be tempted to see the focus of terrorist activity having moved to more insecure 
countries like Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, staying alert in Western economies is 
more than advisable, since it is ultimately the West and its societies that Islamist terrorism – 
perceived to be the globally most prevalent form of terror these days – attempts to hurt. One 
main element of the strategies of groups like Al-Quaeda is to hit the economy as a central 
backbone to the wealth and prosperity that these groups loathe. This fact becomes even 
clearer when taking a look at what kinds of targets have been affected by attacks in the last 
couple of years. Most of the time, businesses were amongst the most affected, highlighting the 
importance of the terrorist issue to companies once again (cf. Baumert 2010, 173). 
Figure 2: Type of facility struck by terrorist attack. Source: Own illustration.3 
These explanations are not intended to negate responsibility within the political domain for 
fighting terrorism, but it is in the interest of every company to be diligent in keeping its 
operations running to the best possible extent once it is affected by a terrorist attack. 
3 Based on data from National Counterterrorism Center - Worldwide Incidents Tracking System 
(https://wits.nctc.gov). Excluding attacks targeted at cars. Non-combatants only. 
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This undertaking naturally falls into the realm of crisis management. It has to be distinguished 
from risk management, a corporate function to monitor and deal with financial and operative 
risks inherent to an organization’s business (cf. Aschauer 2008, 103; Töpfer 2002). A crisis 
induced by a terror attack does, in fact, constitute a risk to the business, however, it is “an 
unusual situation outside the normal operating framework of the affected organization” (cf. 
Reilly 2008, 331). Crisis management has gained more public attention and has seen a surge 
of research in academic journals particularly following 9/11 (cf. Fowler et al. 2007, 88ff.). 
What has been noted, though, is that crisis management is still not very well integrated into 
strategic management (cf. Pearson/Clair 1998, 59; Ritchie 2009). This circumstance prevails 
despite the fact that strategic management of organizations encompasses managing the core 
business just as well as exceptional situations like crises (cf. Preble 1997). It is due to this line 
of thought that the present work wants, amongst others, to demonstrate an integration of crisis 
management into strategic thinking through the specific example of the terrorist threat. A 
broader presentation of the goals of this work follows. 
1.2 Problem definition and scope of research 
The current threat of terrorism for companies is established as one motivational factor to shed 
light onto this issue from a business perspective. Since this issue is most probably going to 
preoccupy managers for many years to come, taking a long-term, and therefore, strategic 
perspective, makes perfect sense. However, there is still no definite approach to dealing with 
terror crises from a strategic management angle (cf. Shrivastava 1993, 33). Hence, it is 
especially important to explain how crisis management is incorporated into a broader strategic 
context. The current work addresses this research gap. 
Furthermore, the practical implications of crisis management in an era of terrorism need to be 
reviewed. The literature proposes that crisis management research may consider investigating 
an array of different specific industries with public rail transport being one of them (cf. 
Fowler et al. 2007, 100). One reason for this is that terrorists have traditionally targeted public 
transportation systems as seen through the attacks in Madrid, London or Mumbai as well as 
the plots against German railway or Amtrak in the US. The railway is considered a soft and 
easily accessible target where the impact of disruption can be severe (cf. Barnes/Hiles 2011, 
574). Curiously, there has been very little research on this specific industry in conjunction 
with terrorism and crisis management. The work known to the author includes a study by 
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Blanco et al. (2007) assessing direct and indirect economic costs incurred by the 2004 Madrid 
rail attack, as well as several reports on rail security issues (cf. Jenkins/Butterworth 2010; 
Jenkins et al. 2010; Taylor et al. 2005; Riley 2004). However, research becomes increasingly 
scarce when going from an economic to a managerial angle. While some companies and 
industries have already found attention, such as tourism providers (cf. Evans/Elphick 2005; 
Sullivan-Taylor/Wilson 2009), aviation (cf. Henderson 2008) or hotels (cf. Aschauer 2008; 
Stafford et al. 2002), there is still no work known to the author so far which takes to the topic 
of terror crisis management in the German rail industry. 
It should be noted, though, that this work is not intended to be considered a panacea for 
coping with crises, since a universal formula cannot exist. Crises are single, unique events 
with unfolding characteristics that cannot be entirely foreseen (cf. Baumert 2010, 174). The 
present work rather wants to present a systematic approach to the issue of crisis management 
based on a differentiated view of its components and theoretical foundations. These 
elaborations shall function as decision guidance to the reader for a methodically sound line of 
action in event of a crisis. The work also represents a depiction of the latest state in current 
crisis management research and practice. 
1.3 Research question and objectives 
Therefore, the main research question of this work is expressed as follows: How is crisis 
management as an answer to terrorist threats structured in German rail travel companies? This 
question entails some distinctive underlying thoughts as preconditions. First, it supposes that 
there already is a suggested way of dealing with crisis management. It is indeed true that the 
literature has already approached crisis management, its functions and processes with regard 
to terror-like catastrophes, in general as well as in different industries, as already mentioned 
above. However, these findings may or may not be transferrable to our specific case. It is due 
to this line of thought that a suggested crisis management process model is intended to be 
compared and contrasted with the actions actually undertaken at the companies forming this 
work’s data basis. Furthermore, another presupposed condition is that the threat of terrorism is 
noted as a topic worth pondering about in the relevant enterprises. In conducting this research, 
it shall also be examined which level of relevance is attributed to terror threats and crisis 
preparedness. Lastly, since the work takes a strategic angle, it will investigate when and if this 
approach is applied in practice. There may be several reasons for viewing terrorism related 
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crises as strategic threats. For instance, customer frequentation may be psychologically 
impacted and contract out of fear of travelling (cf. Sönmez/Graefe 1998). Suboptimal crisis 
management efforts may have a longer-term negative image effect. Such examples ultimately 
touch on revenues and affect competitiveness. Outlined below is a description of how the 
work intends to proceed in confronting these issues. 
1.4 Outline 
After this brief introduction, the following chapter will go on to illuminate core concepts of 
this work. It shall start out by making the notion of terrorism clearer. It is indeed a topic quite 
frequently used in the media and therefore, probably common to the reader. However, 
inferring knowledge about terrorism from personal exposure to media coverage alone lacks a 
sound background for approaching this subject. As a topic theoretically rather distant to 
management studies, it should be introduced to have necessary background knowledge for 
recognizing the nature of its connection to business management. Subsequently, the naturally 
broad concept of crisis will be portrayed and narrowed down to this work’s specific focus. 
This will provide the frame for approaching crucial aspects of crisis management as well as its 
process. With this foundation, the following part will present the research method and 
hypotheses. The penultimate part of this work will present empirical data obtained from 
undertaking the practical research. In the end, a conclusive overview of the main points is 
offered along with a critical assessment of the value of this work. Suggestions for further 
study and an outlook for the research area will be set out to close the final subsumption. 
2 Core concepts 
2.1 Terrorism 
2.1.1 Working definitions 
As this work focuses on the strategic implications of terrorist induced crises, it is first and 
foremost important to define the phenomenon of terrorism and narrow down its relevant 
aspects for this specific research. 
With regard to a terminological introduction, several definitions of terrorism have already 
been presented in the literature. A potential starting point is to consider legal definitions. For 
instance, the Council of the European Union (cf. 2002, 2) regards terrorism as threats and 
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intentional acts against persons or property, which aim at intimidating a population and 
damaging political, economic or social foundations of a society. 
Another possible definition can be found in Resolution 1566 by the United Nations Security 
Council (2004, 2), which refers to terrorist acts as 
“criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or 
serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in 
the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or 
compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any 
act, […] by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, 
religious or other similar nature”. 
Furthermore, national law has also given birth to numerous other examples of terrorism 
definitions (cf. Golder/Williams 2004; Smith 2003). However, from a legal viewpoint, casting 
the term of terrorism in a mold is not an easy endeavor. This approach is impaired by the 
danger of taking positions and ideologically misusing the term (cf. Saul 2008, 11). Thus, 
attempts of defining terrorism run the risk of being inherently subjective (cf. Hoffmann 2006, 
23). That fact is also expressed in the phrase ‘What is a terrorist for one, can be termed a 
‘freedom fighter’ by others’ (cf. Golder/Williams 2004, 272; Shugart II 2006, 10). 
Less affected by such restrictions, scholars of terrorism have also proposed a number of 
possible definitions, amongst them Enders/Sandler (2006), Hoffmann (2006) and Shugart II 
(2006). Enders/Sandler (2006, 3) describe terrorism as the “premeditated use or threat to use 
violence by individuals or subnational groups in order to obtain a political or social objective 
through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of immediate victims.” 
By revisiting the many propositions for defining terrorism, it becomes evident that there is no 
clear consensus.4 Nevertheless, what most efforts to illustrate the term have in common is the 
presence of violence, a public audience, a certain cause and the spreading of fear (cf. Jackson 
et al. 2007, 2; Shugart II 2006, 10; Valiño et al. 2010, 4). As it is necessary to have at least a 
working notion for this concept central to the present work and to delineate it from other 
4 For further elaborations on the problems of defining terrorism, refer to Cooper (2001), Fletcher (2006), 
Schmid/Jongman (2005) and Walter (2004). 
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forms of violence such as war and crime, it shall be proposed that the aforementioned 
definition suggested by Enders/Sandler (2006) be used for the upcoming analyses. 
Apart from plain terminology, terrorism itself can be further broken apart and classified in 
many ways, depending on criteria such as the type of attack (assassination, kidnapping, etc.) 
or the weapons used (bombs, suicide, biological, etc.) (cf. Schmid/Jongman 2005, 39ff.; 
Valiño et al. 2010, 5). Another categorization hinges on the occurrence of terrorism. Attacks 
involving actors and sites of only one country can be deemed national terrorism, whereas 
transnational terrorism links incidents in one country to actors of another (e.g. foreign trained 
terrorist, global implications of 9/11) (cf. Enders/Sandler 2006, 7). That distinction plays a 
role insofar, since these days the terrorist threats perceived as the most predominant ones 
count towards the transnational category, in the form of Islamist motivated terror attacks. The 
reason for this can only be understood in a broader context of the terrorism’s development, 
which will subsequently be discussed. 
2.1.2 Development 
Although terrorism has received a jump in worldwide attention from the attacks of September 
11 onwards, it is far from being a new phenomenon. Its origins date back in history at least as 
far as the resistance of the Jewish Zealots and Sicarii against the Roman Empire (cf. Laqueur 
2000, 10f.; Rapoport 1984).5 However, the high number of victims of the 9/11 attacks, its 
media visibility and global impact – psychological, political and economic – have marked a 
turning point in modern day terrorism (cf. Rapoport 2004, 419). 
As an expression, terrorism initially emerged as a result of the French Revolution (régime de 
la terreur) and from then on, it is possible to identify four waves of terrorist activity (cf. 
Valiño et al. 2010, 6). The first wave materialized around 1880 characterized by anarchists 
such as the Russian group Narodnaya Volya (“People’s Will”), who are considered to be the 
first group that systematically carried out a clearly defined strategy to radically transform 
society (cf. Shugart II 2006, 14). It was followed by separatist liberation movements in 
various parts of the world (cf. Hoffmann 2006, 11ff.) and left wing terrorism initiating in the 
1960s, infamous for groups such as the German Red Army Faction (RAF) (cf. Shugart II 
5 For a more detailed introduction into the history of terrorism, refer to Law (2009) and White (2002). 
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2006, 20ff.)6. The fourth and still concurrent wave encompasses religion as its distinctive 
characteristic (cf. Rapoport 2004, 424). It is deemed to have found its beginning during the 
Iranian Revolution in 1979, fuelled by “pan-Islamic dreams of uniting fundamentalist Muslim 
states, freed from western cultural contamination, under Caliphate hegemony and Shar’ia 
law” (Shugart II 2006, 8).7 With those radical foundations laid, subsequent incidents such as 
the Soviet war in Afghanistan and the demise of the Soviet Union contributed, amongst 
others, to the fourth wave still haunting the world in the 21st century with the declared enmity 
of radical Islamist terror groups against the modern Western civilization. 
Further attempts were made to understand the phenomenon of terrorism and its roots from 
various other angles: psychological, religious, social, political or economic.8 However, it is 
not in the scope of this paper to analyze causes of terrorism more in-depth. Such research is in 
fact a focal foundation for effectively countering terrorism, yet more so in the arena of public 
policy. It lies mainly with efforts of the international community, governments and federal 
authorities to combat effects and find solutions for the roots of terrorism. Still, that does not 
imply for the remaining parties to rely exclusively on political mechanisms to secure them 
from terrorist threats. One of those parties affected is the economy as a whole and the 
businesses taking part in it. The necessity for those actors to actively consider their exposure 
to terrorist activity is also visible in the terrorists’ indifference to collateral damage. Islamist 
terrorists do not have to distinguish between the types of targets, let them be ‘conventional’, 
military ones or civilians, as expressed by Osama Bin Laden’s 1998 comment “As far as we 
are concerned, they are all targets” (quoted in National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon 
the United States 2004, 47). Additionally, it can be pointed out that Al-Qaeda considers 
business as a top priority target, as Bin Laden considered “bleeding America to the point of 
bankruptcy” (quoted in Costigan 2007, 2). The relevance for the business community to 
consider their exposure to possible terrorist attacks will therefore, be explained more in-depth 
in the next section. 
6 Aust (2005) describes the fact, that many RAF attacks were targeted at business professionals. 
7 Fromkin (2009) shows, though, that the breeding of conflict arising from the Middle East traces even 
further back to the artificial border-drawing after World War I in response to the downfall of the Ottoman 
Empire. 
8 For work on these aspects refer, amongst others, to Crenshaw (1998), Krueger (2007), Li (2005) and 
Victoroff (2005). 
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2.1.3 Economic relevance 
Attacks of Islamist terror groups like Al Qaeda and its affiliates aim at causing economic 
damage in the countries affected (cf. Aschauer 2008, 20). The economy is therefore a central 
target in the strategy of Islamist terrorist activity (cf. Aschauer 2008, 20ff.). The type of 
damage that can be created and its subsequent cost can roughly be divided into both direct and 
indirect costs. Direct costs arise as an immediate result of an attack and can include, amongst 
others, elements like the loss of property and/or human live, the costs of rescue and recovery 
and the damage to businesses resulting from temporary closures or loss of sales (cf. Valiño et 
al. 2010, 15ff.). Indirect costs by contrast accrue in consequence of the reactions by the public 
and private sector following terrorist incidents (cf. Valiño et al. 2010, 17ff.). Governments 
can increase their expenditure on security measures, restrict freedoms and issue new safety 
regulations, while consumer behavior may alter and contract out of greater fear and 
uncertainty about the future (cf. Valiño et al. 2010, 17ff.).9 The business environment 
therefore becomes more unpredictable as new regulations add further frictions to global trade 
flows, business opportunities might wane and interruptions along value chain activities occur 
in the aftermath of terrorist attacks (cf. Czinkota/Knight 2005, 42ff.). 
In its focus on economic implications of terrorist attacks, the literature has been productive in 
the last years. Tavares (2004), for instance, focuses on the economy in general and develops a 
model to estimate the effects of a terrorist attack on GDP. According to his results, the impact 
could lie in the range of approximately 0.2 percent. Much larger is the effect of about an 
estimated 10% lower growth due to ETA terrorist activity in Spain’s Basque region (cf. 
Abadie/Gardeazabal 2003). Other indicators such as the FDI could vary by up to 5 percent of 
total GDP in response to terrorist activity (cf. Abadie/Gardeazabal 2007). In a less 
macroeconomic ambit, Richardson et al. (2005; 2007; 2009) have directed attention on 
impacts and consequences of terror attacks with regard to business sectors such as 
infrastructure, here more specifically ports, highways or the electricity system in the US. 
Work by Ito/Lee (2005) and Blunk et al. (2006) shows that travel in the US airline industry 
has been negatively affected by the 9/11 attacks, amounting to a fall in demand of roughly 
30%. Furthermore, given that stock markets’ immediate reactions reflect their assessment of 
economic costs of attacks, Baumert (2010) studied the effects of 9/11, as well as the attacks of 
Madrid and London on stock market reactions. The adverse effects of terrorism on tourism in 
9 For a closer look on the perception of risk and uncertainty in general see Breakwell (2007), with a 
focus on terrorism see Mueller (2004). 
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general and more specifically on the hotel industry as one component of tourism have also 
received examination (cf. Aschauer 2008; Stafford et al. 2006). All these considerations 
illustrate the importance of terrorist issues and their impacts on manifold industries. 
Henceforth, businesses are in the need to consider the global repercussions of terrorism and 
prepare against the critical asymmetry they are facing, as prominently expressed by the IRA 
after a failed attack in 1984: “We only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky 
always.” (quoted in Cowell 2010). However, a 100 per cent prevention surely is a fruitless 
goal (Richardson et al. 2005, 3) and cannot be in the scope of anyone confronted with 
terrorism. Still, as a first step, it is necessary to acknowledge that terrorism is in fact a 
business problem (cf. Czinkota/Knight 2005, 45). Following from that point on, anticipation 
and planning of terrorism effects can make companies more resilient and reduce their 
operation’s vulnerability against possible attacks (cf. Czinkota/Knight 2005; Sheffi 2007). 
Even more, firms can build superior management strategies by dealing with the ‘before, 
during and after’ of terrorism in a way that differentiates them from their competitors and thus 
has the potential to provide a competitive edge (cf. Czinkota/Knight 2005, 44). Already 
having recognized this significance, many corporations have elaborated crisis management 
plans to deal with potential disasters, let them be of a terrorist nature, caused by manmade 
failure or natural disasters. 
How one can approach the phenomenon of crisis more methodologically and how exactly 
viable responses to crisis induced by attacks could look like is explored in the following 
chapters. 
2.2 Crisis 
2.2.1 Terminology and classification 
When dealing with the literature concerning crises, one encounters very quickly a vast 
abundance of varying terms attempting to describe the state of a crisis: the term crisis itself, a 
disaster, an occurring contingency, risk, errors, incidents, accidents, disruptions, catastrophes, 
and so forth. Often it is not so clear how and where it is feasible, if at all, to draw a line 
between the different items.10 Complicating matters further, the term ‘crisis’ is applied in a 
growing number of contexts and has seen an inflationary use over time (cf. Glaeßer 2006, 11). 
Merely thinking of one’s own more recent contact with the term will make various occasions 
10 Power (2007) hints that this debate may lack substance for these terms refer vaguely to the same 
concept. 
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spring up: a certain company’s crisis, financial crisis, economic crisis or monetary crisis are 
expressions all too well familiar from the international media coverage of the last few years. 
How is it possible to bring in a more systematic understanding of the concept of crisis into 
this seeming randomness? 
When looking at the etymological origins of the word ‘crisis’, it apparently derives from the 
Old Greek ‘krisis’, describing a situation of decision or differentiation (cf. Glaeßer 2006, 11). 
Meanwhile, the term is used in a wide variety of domains, as the chart stated below illustrates. 
Scope of crises Characterization by areas of research 
Individual sphere Medicine: 
 Crisis as a turning point during an infection
Psychology: 
 Personal situation perceived as insoluble by an individual’s
capabilities 
Collective sphere Politics: 
 Endangered national interests due to conflict or war
Economics: 
 Exogenous shocks; recessions
Management: 
 Considerable negative impact on a company’s development
Table 1: Fields of crisis research. Source: Based on Glaeßer (2006, 12). 
Naturally, the area of management is the relevant one for this specific work and in that sense, 
crisis will subsequently be regarded as an 
exceptional situation with considerable negative influence on the management and 
continuity of a company (cf. Aschauer 2010, 101). 
Thereby, certain components of a crisis situation become clear. Amongst the main elements 
one can discern the attribute of hazard, as the continuity of operations might be endangered, 
as well as an often surprising occurrence of such an unusual – exceptional – event, which is 
not part of the daily routine (cf. Zelewski 1995, 898). Likewise elevating the seriousness of 
the event is a generally short reaction time and an associated time pressure (cf. Glaeßer 2006, 
13f.). A further distinctive element can be identified in the process character of a crisis, 
meaning that it follows a path of evolution, which in turn, has the potential to be influenced to 
the benefit of the affected actors – that is the basis why it makes sense to consider crisis 
management at all (cf. Aschauer 2010, 101; Glaeßer 2006, 13f.). A more manageable and 
positive connotation of crisis can also be found in Max Frisch’s comment that a crisis can 
even be a productive situation – you just have to stop regarding it as a catastrophe (quoted in 
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Landert 2004, 53f.). Looking further east, Chinese mentality concerning crisis is expressed in 
their word for ‘crisis’ being made up of the two characters for ‘danger’ and ‘opportunity’ 
alike (cf. Fink 1986, 1). However, that mindset should be used cautiously in a crisis event 
such as a terrorist attack with possible human fatalities. Under those circumstances, making 
use of a chance could rather mean to minimize the negative effects up to the largest extent 
feasible, instead of viewing it as chance like successfully managing a corporate turnaround 
after a crisis, which quite apparently is a different kind of crisis situation for a company. 
After having examined the term of crisis, this leads to a more systematic view of how one can 
classify the types of business crisis to be encountered, their differing origins, etc. The attempt 
of categorizing crises bears at least as much diverse options as already included in the 
definition. In relation to the factor of time, for instance, the literature makes a distinction 
between potential, latent and acute crisis (cf. Glaeßer 2006, 15; Zelewski 1995). The idea 
behind this is straightforward and can be derived from the wording. A potential crisis is more 
or less the basic state an entity finds itself in (cf. Linde 1994, 9). If there is no crisis, there can 
always be one waiting to emerge. A latent crisis already lingers, but an enterprise might not 
yet be fully aware of all its symptoms and be able to construct the bigger picture, whereas an 
acute crisis is already obvious via its grave effects (cf. Dreyer et al. 2001, 5). It is also 
possible to make a more refined distinction between the phases, leading to the view of six 
evolving steps (cf. Ritchie 2004). In a pre-event stage, crises are still potential, while in the 
prodromal stage it is already visible that a crisis is about to hit. In the emergency stage the 
crisis hits and needs immediate damage limitation, while in an already more intermediate 
crisis phase, emphasis is applied to restoring the services that were affected (cf. Ritchie 2004, 
674). During the fifth and sixth stage, namely recovery and – hopefully – resolution, longer-
term restoration and reinvestment play a role until a state of normalcy is reinstated (cf. Ritchie 
2004, 674). 
Attending more specifically to the terrorist issue, this leads to another possible classification 
of temporal depiction as provided below, which explores the development of crises over time 
and the resultant public sense of emergency that is incurred by them. 
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Figure 3: Development of crises (with examples of terrorist events). Source: Based on Aschauer 2006, 
102f.; Dreyer et al. 2001, 5ff. 
Besides the aspect of time, other factors can be used for classifying crises, such as their 
origins, which can roughly be of a natural, human or technical cause (cf. Zelweski 1995, 899). 
Theses causes can be split up and combined even further, since technical failure might be due 
to production errors or an electricity blackout or a combination of both, just as human 
mistakes can encompass behavior ranging from machine mishandling over a faulty 
procurement decision to an inappropriate overall strategic focus (cf. Zelewski 1995, 899). By 
that, it becomes clear that a never-ending causal chain is basically possible, but instead of 
becoming subject to an infinite regress, one needs to design and to cut off the process in a way 
that is suitable for the specific analyzing needs of a company’s situation. Henceforth, fitting to 
the present analysis’ focus, a classification developed by Sheffi (2009) shall be proposed, 
which distinguishes three disruption categories, namely: natural disasters, accidents and 
intentional attacks – such as terrorist attacks. However, classifying a crisis is merely the first 
step. In the following, a crisis asks you to respond to and deal with it. How a company can 
manage, such a situation shall be examined in the next section. 
2.2.2 Crisis management 
2.2.2.1 Preliminary thoughts 
Once the phenomenon of crisis has been introduced, the next logical step would be to 
consider how to handle a crisis situation. By embarking on such an endeavor, one has arrived 
in the realm of crisis management. Management in this sense refers to the task to secure the 
long-term survival of an enterprise, including all aspects necessary for sustaining its decision-
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making ability (cf. Müller 1986, 49ff.). This becomes particularly visible in a crisis, since 
such a situation has fundamental significance for the continued operations of an enterprise (cf. 
Müller 1986, 49ff.). The consideration of crisis management, therefore, seems to be fittingly 
located at a strategic level. Pauchant et al. (1991, 214) also see crisis management as 
intertwined with an organization’s strategy, since crisis management’s actions encompass the 
organization as a whole as well as its relations to its environment. Hence, crisis management 
must be located on a strategic level. Combining it with a holistic strategic management 
process model will therefore be undertaken in short. Before doing so, the discussion revolving 
around crisis management must first be filled with substance. 
Crisis management surely is not a new invention in business. Still, different authors ascribe 
differing starting points to it. Müller (1986, 19), for instance, goes back to the 1920s to 
discover early forms of crisis management due to insolvencies and corporate restructuring. 
Others, however, locate the origins to the conflict between the US and the former USSR. 
During the Kennedy era, the Cuba crisis in 1961 supposedly gave rise to the notion of both 
concepts of crisis and management in conjunction, and from then on, crisis management made 
its way from the political arena into the managerial territory (cf. Schulten 1995, 3). The roots 
of “modern” crisis management are then attributed to the 1982 ‘Tylenol poisoning crisis’ of 
pharmaceutical and health care giant Johnson & Johnson (cf. Mitroff 2001, 13ff.). 
The narrative of the ‘Tylenol poisoning crisis’ is that an unknown person filled Tylenol 
capsules with cyanide before placing them back on the shelves of several stores in the 
Chicago area. As a result, seven people died after having taken the tampered medication. This 
act of sabotage caused widespread concern in the public whether Johnson & Johnson’s 
product was still safe and trustworthy. Even though this incident already dates back about 30 
years, it is still very much up-to-date. The anthrax letters in the US in the months after 9/11 
bear similarity to such a contamination of items of everyday day life, and have shown that 
contemporary terrorism does not just have to be confined to bombings. Apart from claiming 
lives, the fine anthrax spores also contaminated the mail-sorting equipment in several United 
States Postal Service (USPS) facilities. They had to be closed down for clean-up for two years 
and it was only due to USPS’s excess capacity that mail processing could be re-routed and its 
operations were not disrupted more severely (cf. Sheffi 2007, 171f.). 
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Crises like the Tylenol crisis were, however, not the only company crisis in recent decades 
that has shaken the business community and the broader public. A brief illustrative collection 
of examples of (in)famous company crises during the last decades will be given below. 
Year Name Description 
1979 Three Mile Island Nuclear meltdown in a reactor near Harrisburg, US 
1982 Tylenol poisoning Cyanide sabotage of Johnson & Johnson’s Tylenol 
product 
1984 Bhopal disaster A methyl gas leak in a Union Carbide plant in India 
kills and harms thousands of people 
1986 Challenger 
explosion 
Space shuttle breaks apart shortly after take-off, 
grounding the following NASA missions for more 
than two years 
1989 Exxon Valdez Huge oil spill near Alaska 
2001 Enron scandal Accounting fraud with ultimate insolvency 
2010 Toyota Break problems causing deaths and vehicle recalls 
2010 BP Explosion of oil rig Deep Water Horizon with 
following oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico 
2011 Fukushima Nuclear meltdown after earthquake 
Table 2: Company Crises. Source: Own illustration. 
Few of the aforementioned crises could be regarded as successfully managed, or at least in 
part successfully managed. Almost all of them have already received scrutiny in various case 
studies that shed light on these crises’ components (cf. Harrald et al. 1990; Meshkati 1991; 
Ishikawa/Tsujimoto 2009). Even though these components are naturally unique to any single 
crisis event, what could be determined in a large number of cases was a serious lack of ability 
to quickly recognize and deal with the crisis (cf. Mitroff 2001). 
In fact, an early identification and acknowledgement is vital to all the following steps of 
managing a crisis. In doing so, one already embarks on the first step in crisis management. 
This processual view of crisis management is one way how to approach it; the other would 
take a more structured perspective, referring to organizational design with regard to the 
departments and people involved with their respective roles and responsibilities, such as for 
instance a crisis task force team (cf. Zelewski 1995, 906ff.). Those two aspects are naturally 
intertwined. However, this work will place an emphasis on the processual approach of crisis 
management and present it in the following section. 
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2.2.2.2 Crisis management process 
To make the complex process of coping with a crisis more comprehensible, it can be broken 
into several steps that should rather indicate a logical order of the tasks that require 
management, instead of being viewed as a strict chronological sequence (cf. Müller 1986, 
317). 
Concerning the necessary steps in the crisis management process, there seems to be a 
consensus in the literature as to what elements are sensible to include, although the way in 
which the several steps are broken down or synthesized may vary. An early research by 
Pearson/Mitroff (1993) builds on information from crisis managers of Fortune 1000 
companies and proposes a five-stage procedure. Comparable results of mapping the 
management phases can be found in the suggestions of Augustine (1995), Töpfer (1999, 59) 
and Fink/Siebe (2006, 320). 
Figure 4: Stages of crisis management. Source: Based on Pearson/Mitroff (1993, 53). 
The denomination of the stages might be self-explanatory by mere wording; however, we will 
also take a closer look at some important elements. The starting point of every crisis handling 
is an early identification of what might constitute a reason for crisis. A way to approach such 
an early identification is through the consideration of so-called ‘weak signals’. The idea of 
weak signals had been introduced by Ansoff (1975) and is based on the assumption that 
incidents do have certain warning signals, albeit not very clear at times, but there is an 
opportunity to scan and detect them before they strike with their full magnitude. Companies 
do take that opportunity by various well-known means such as Delphi techniques, scenario 
planning or environmental monitoring (cf. Krystek/Müller-Stewens 1999; Welge/Al-Laham 
2008, 432ff.). An early preoccupation with such issues is crucial, since the longer that time is 
permitted to pass, the more reaction options are destroyed and the number of feasible 
countermeasures left is more and more reduced (cf. Krystek/Müller-Stewens 1999, 175). 
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For combating such constraints and for preparing possible countermeasures at an early stage, 
it is helpful to prioritize the identified threats that are being faced. This can be accomplished 
by mapping incidents’ severity level against the probability that they will occur. An additional 
benefit of doing so is that it can foster an understanding for adequate resource use in an 
emergency. A visualization of such an exemplary mapping is shown below. Of course, the 
items and their respective location on the chart will vary according to each company’s unique 
situation, its industrial environment and own vulnerability or exposure to certain incidents. 
Figure 5: Example of incident priority chart. Source: Based on Sheffi/Rice Jr. 2005, 44. 
The following prevention and preparation phase indicates the need to create crisis teams and 
devise plans to support a response in the case of an incident (cf. Pearson/Mitroff 1993, 53). 
Such thoughts are also present in government publications concerning private sector crisis 
management, supplying supporting checklists and setting norms (cf. Bundesministerium des 
Innern (BMI) 2008), just as well as institutional players in the field do, such as the 
International Organization of Standardization (ISO) issuing recommendations about necessary 
elements for crisis handling (cf. Johanson/Nilsson 2006, 92). 
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Furthermore, it is advisable, to conduct regular test runs of the crisis management plans once 
in place to evaluate their effectiveness and train employees (cf. Pearson/Mitroff 1993, 53). In 
Germany, for instance, the LÜKEX (Länderübergreifende Krisenmanagementübung 
(EXercise)) brings together public and private sector actors to facilitate cooperation in the 
case of emergency. It had already simulated threats to a world soccer championship in 2005 
and a pandemic in 2007 (cf. Borchers 2007). The most recent simulation involved multiple 
terrorist attacks on German critical infrastructure, in this case, being transport and railway (cf. 
Unger 2010, 439), which has underlining relevance to the topic. 
As a crisis hits, the intent of the damage containment stage is to respond successfully in order 
to limit negative effects (cf. Pearson/Mitroff 1993, 53). The ultimate goal is to keep the 
critical operations running to the best extent possible while trying to restore the remaining 
services (cf. BMI 2010, 23). However, the acute phase of a crisis can also be complex and 
chaotic, so while implementing countermeasures, flexibility is always an issue (cf. Ritchie 
2004, 675). Another key component is communication. Crisis communication has to be taken 
into account from the very beginning of a crisis, whereby it needs to address the interests of 
the stakeholders like media and customers, but also internal communication (cf. BMI 2010; 
29; Ritchie 2004, 676f.). The consistency and quality of response is one aspect of limiting the 
(media) harm to an organization that could potentially be done in case of crisis (cf. BMI 2010; 
29; Ritchie 2004, 676f.). 
In the following, recovery then concerns a longer-term perspective of crisis management, 
after quick and direct reactions to an outbreak have begun. It can encompass use of alternative 
sites for operations, if needed, and is about bringing the organization back to normal (cf. 
Pearson/Mitroff 53f.; Töpfer 1999). 
Leaping into focus is that the process itself does not have a definite ending point. The fact that 
crisis management models usually do incorporate learning from the crisis makes crisis 
management recursive and builds in a feedback loop. When learning from a crisis, the 
effectiveness of the formerly chosen and executed response strategy is assessed and evaluated 
with the aim of enhancing the quality of future actions (cf. Ritchie 2004, 674ff.). 
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Now, that the core concepts of this work along with a more elaborated notion of crisis 
management and its components have been introduced, it seems advisable to take a look at the 
link to practice and examine some case studies already available in the literature that have 
attended to connecting crisis management with the experience of certain industries. 
2.2.2.3 Significant case studies 
As mentioned in the introduction, a few works have discussed crisis management in 
connection with terrorist related risks and how companies in practice have approached these. 
Shedding light on their results shall help in further building a reliable basis for this research. 
We shall consider papers focusing on travel and transport, as their findings may connect most 
likely to the rail industry. 
One of the papers concerned with terrorist risk attends to the UK aviation sector (cf. 
Henderson 2008). It applies case study methodology to the case of the alleged 2006 summer 
terrorist plot, whereby it examines the responses by the parties affected, like airlines and 
airport operators. Its aim is to structure these actions according to a sequential crisis 
management model and to find activities relating to the several phases introduced further 
above. For instance, the information published by the media concerning the terror plot was 
regarded as the initiating event, followed by acute security measures from federal authorities 
to tighten baggage regulations (cf. Henderson 2008, 128). These were actions that airports and 
airlines had to implement, causing delays in operations, as well as cancellation of bookings 
(cf. Henderson 2008, 130f.). In the aftermath, disruptions abated and debates about future 
enhancements of travel security measures were being undertaken (cf. Henderson 2008, 
132ff.), conforming in a sense to subsequent feedback processes. Even though not all phases 
were clearly discernible, the paper showed how the model provided a guide for tracking crises 
and indicated the value of prior strategic planning (cf. Henderson 2008, 134). Another paper 
with a focus on the UK-based travel industry has a similar approach, comparing the crisis 
management process model with steps actually undertaken by companies in the time after 
9/11 (cf. Evans/Elphick 2005). This industry had experienced significant losses in revenue, 
job cuts and decreased capacity due to 9/11 (cf. Evans/Elphick 2005, 139). The paper uses 
case study methodology, as well, and conducts interviews with key managers from one tour 
operator. In the pre-crisis preparation phase, the respective company did have a crisis 
management policy with pre-arranged structures of information flow and response plans in 
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 place (cf. Evans/Elphick 2005, 143). After the attacks struck, attention was focused on taking 
care of employees, securing customers who were travelling within the US as well as working 
with the media. The long-term action consisted of capacity adjustment (cf. Evans/Elphick 
2005, 144ff.). Similar findings are present in the work of Sullivan-Taylor/Wilson (2009), 
which also attends to UK airports, airlines as well as tour operators and uses the same 
methodology of interviews. A publication by Taylor et al. (2005) sheds light on practical 
security measures undertaken by US transit companies and incorporates interviews with 
experts from Paris, London and Madrid, who had suffered attacks in the past. Their survey of 
113 of the largest transit operators in the US reveal a conceptual model that broadly 
distinguishes planning, immediate response and long-term recovery (cf. Taylor et al. 2005, 
21f.). The findings show that transit operators remain concerned about the possibility of 
attacks targeting their systems (cf. Taylor 2005, 108). The following section applies these 
results as a starting point from which to transfer them to the German rail market and combine 
them with theoretical deliberations of managerial science. 
So far, the previous chapters have presented the core concepts of this work. With a sound 
understanding of these, we can now embed them in a broader strategic context. The next 
chapter will undertake this task of explaining just how the aspects discussed so far connect 
more precisely to elements of strategic management. 
2.3 Framework integration 
Several aspects of crisis management and strategic management have been introduced so far. 
The purpose of this chapter is to synthesize them into a more holistic framework as a basis for 
developing the research agenda. To undertake a comprehensive conception of crisis 
management and strategy is not far-fetched. Their “potential for synergistic integration” 
(Preble 1997, 769) has already been acknowledged. One reason for this lies in the potential 
for competitive advantage by successful crisis management. It can be based on the superior 
knowledge build in an organization for coping with incidents. If a company can effectively 
institutionalize knowledge learned about crisis management, it is possible to reduce its 
vulnerability to crises in the future (cf. Wang/Belardo 2009, 654). 
A second basis for integration can be found in the compatibility of both the crisis management 
and the strategic management model (cf. Preble 1997, 776). The traditional strategic 
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management model is concerned with the formulation, implementation and evaluation of 
strategies chosen to accomplish strategic goals and objectives (cf. Welge/Al-Laham 2008, 
186ff.). The goal of the formulation activity is to design the strategic course a company wants 
to move on based on an assessment of its external and internal circumstances (cf. Thompson 
et al. 2010, 24ff.). Implementing refers to the operative realization of the plans elaborated in 
the preceding step, whose outcomes then receive examination in an evaluation process 
intended to feed new information acquired throughout the process back to the formulation 
phase (cf. Thompson et al. 2010, 41ff.). However, learning from how well plans are able to be 
executed is not simply a subsequent task, vigilance for new information or deviant results is 
appropriate throughout all stages of the strategic management process (cf. Thompson et al. 
2010, 43). 
Figure 6: Strategic framework of crisis management. Source: Based on Ritchie (2004, 674). 
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The strategic management model is found to be an accurate representation of planning 
practice (cf. Al-Laham 1997; Gintner et al. 1985). The crisis management steps also bear 
similarity to such a procedure. Planning and preparing are part of it, just as implementation of 
containment measures are, which are followed by reflection and feedback processes. Owing 
to that, an integrated framework is presented, encompassing the connection between the 
important issues of crises and strategic management that have been discussed. 
Starting from the top, one can identify the first point of the process comprising the strategy 
formulation aspect with risk assessment and planning tasks. It is possible to link these actions 
to the crisis stages, which one may be confronted with. At the beginning, apparently, crises 
normally fall into a pre-event stage. As a crisis develops over time and enters its acute stages, 
implementation actions gain importance. The framework identifies central aspects to this. For 
instance, it touches on communication as an essential element, since a company’s approach to 
it will significantly affect the success or failure of its crisis management efforts (cf. Benoit 
1997; Preble 1997, 786). It also enumerates collaboration, since a company might need to rely 
on outside services and knowledge (cf. Wang/Belardo 2005, 10). Emergency exercises such 
as LÜKEX showed what this might mean in practice, bringing together public service 
providers such as police or rescue teams with internal company crisis experts. When longer-
term actions enter the scene, evaluation takes precedence. What becomes clear in the model 
once again is the importance of flexibility and feedback. One function of feedback can be 
found in its value as organizational learning. Since crises are low frequency events, 
companies do not have sufficient opportunities to learn regarding this specific issue, therefore, 
learning and closing that knowledge gap is a crucial strategic part of crisis management (cf. 
Wang/Belardo 2005, 258). Another point is that feedback works throughout the process and 
requires constant evaluation in any stage once discrepancies are discovered. In fact, the 
opportunity for learning can be found throughout the whole crisis management process (cf. 
Veil 2011, 140), in a similar taste to learning in the strategic management process. 
Equipped with this foundation, the following chapter will shed light on the research agenda 
derived from the above elaborations. 
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3 Research Design 
3.1 Research Method 
In deciding upon the research method for this work, it is important to bring to one’s mind 
certain characteristics of this research. It is intended to infer statements and accurate 
descriptions of crisis management in rail travel in a way that depicts the real experience and 
environment within a company. To access and capture authentically such a Lebenswelt (cf. 
Mayer 2008, 25) of the actors concerned, it seems adequate to choose a rather open way of 
approaching the research area. It already becomes clear that these thoughts will move the 
research method into a qualitative context. This may also be justified by the fact that 
alternative quantitative methods, in general, rely on a high standardization due to their 
comparative-statistical assessments (cf. Flick et al. 2004, 8). This seems unfavorable for 
approaching a topic for which flexibility has already been noted further above. Another point 
is that there has not yet been extensive research for the chosen research question. A 
quantitative approach, which reduces the possibility of complexity very early on in the 
research process, may therefore cut off potential new insights not thought of or incorporated 
yet in standardized methods (cf. Lamnek 2005, 15). In such a case, allowing more 
comprehensive verbal descriptions of the issues at interest do more justice to the 
sophistication of managerial acting. 
Paying respect to this, it has been decided to choose interviewing as the research method for 
this work. In general, thinking of a research interview may make it seem like a colloquial 
conversation at first, however, the differences to everyday communication emerge from the 
following (cf. Gläser/Laudel 2010, 111f.): 
 There are certain pre-settled conventions, such as that the interviewee may refuse to
answer a question without sanctions.
 There is an acknowledged roles allocation between the interviewer and the
interviewee.
 The interviewer has the task to lead the dialogue. The questions are posed with a
certain background of knowledge interest and fulfill the specific goal of information
collection.
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Interviews in qualitative research may take different forms (cf. Hopf 2004). Here, it is 
necessary to choose the kind of interview that corresponds best with a certain study’s 
knowledge interest and seems most fitting to answer the overall research question. The 
present purpose of investigation is to gather information on how companies react to the threat 
of terrorism with their crisis management processes. It can be expected that the specific 
knowledge about such issues requires profound consideration and therefore, will be centered 
within certain specialized professionals inside an organization. Thus, this work will use expert 
interviews. Expert interviews are generally conducted as so-called guided interviews (cf. 
Mayer 2008, 43). This means that the interview situation is not strictly standardized; instead, 
the interviewer will have a prepared list of open questions as a flexible dialogue basis (cf. 
Gläser/Laudel 2010, 111). This approach is especially advisable in a context when the 
research interest is composed of several different aspects and processes, which need to be 
reconstructed (cf. Gläser/Laudel 2010, 111). 
In order to prevent arbitrariness in such a rather open and flexible approach, there are a 
number of different methodological principles to follow to ensure research quality. 
Traditional criteria like validity and reliability taken from the quantitative paradigm are less 
applicable in this case; therefore, qualitative quality criteria take a somewhat different form 
(cf. Flick 2007, 487ff.; Mayring 2002, 140ff.). Amongst them is the requirement of a rule-
governed procedure, which means to document how the research result was generated, 
making clear the process of data collection and explicating its interpretation (cf. Mayring 
144ff.). This is ensured through the fact that the development of propositions and questions is 
theory-driven. Additionally, the interpretation of the interview results will follow a 
predetermined logic of qualitative content analysis, which will be introduced in short in the 
data analysis section. These provisions make the research inter-subjectively reviewable. 
However, several classical problems may arise in interview situations. For instance, even 
though an interview situation should be as neutral as possible, it is nevertheless a social 
interaction and therefore, the actions – verbal and nonverbal – of both interview partners 
shape their behavior towards each other (cf. Mayer 2008, 100f.). The interviewee may want to 
anticipate the research results and modify his responses so as to reflect a position that he 
considers desirable. This might be supported if an interviewer, being inexperienced with the 
required flexibility of the interview situation, spontaneously creates question formats that are 
suggestive (cf. Gläser/Laudel 2010, 135ff.). An interview situation also requires balancing the 
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response behavior of the interviewee in a sense that he does neither stray from the topic nor 
reduce the answers to simple sentences. A short-spoken comportment, however, may also be a 
manifestation of lack of time, especially in the context of professional experts. These 
addressed problems cannot always be satisfyingly avoided. Nevertheless, some light was shed 
on these issues to create awareness, since sensitizing may help in recognizing and possibly 
reducing their effect. 
The introductory background knowledge on research methodology shall be of help in further 
conducting and assessing the following procedures. As a next step, it will be necessary to 
develop specific propositions to channel the research interest. 
3.2 Derivation of propositions 
To address potential research propositions, it is helpful to remember this work’s overall 
research question stated at the very beginning. It asks the question of how crisis management 
as an answer to terrorist threats is structured in German rail travel companies. It was already 
outlined in the introduction, that this research question is composed of several aspects. First, 
the consideration of infrastructure attacks in the past and public information available on 
trainings such as LÜKEX suggest, that the threat of terrorism may be a considered issue in the 
relevant enterprises. In this sense, the first proposition may be formulated as: 
Proposition 1: Terrorism is an acknowledged threat to rail business. 
Since the work takes a strategic angle, it shall also be investigated whether this approach is 
applied in practice. As it has been derived further above, attacks may threaten long-term 
business prospects especially in sensitive areas such as travel and transport. Realizing this 
leads to the second proposition, which is: 
Proposition 2: Rail businesses will consider this threat to be of strategic relevance. 
Furthermore, it has been discussed that crisis management can be approached in a way that 
structures the different measures forming part of it. Structural outlines prevalent in the 
literature and practice of other industries have features that make them comparable to a 
strategic procedure, distinguishing phases of planning and preparation, implementation and 
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evaluation. Considering this, proposition 3 reckons that the rail industry may have adopted 
similar lines of thought. 
Proposition 3: Rail businesses draw upon crisis management plans, which consist of 
separate actions that broadly follow a concept of planning, implementation and feedback. 
The literature suggests that knowledge can be considered a crucial aspect in crisis 
management. Furthermore, it needs to be understood that it is not the mere presence of 
knowledge itself that creates value, but rather the application of it (cf. Alavi/Leidner 2001, 
122ff.). Knowledge also needs to be practiced in order not to decay (cf. Alavi/Leidner 2001, 
118). It can be hypothesized that a focus on crisis knowledge will play an important role in 
our sample. Associated with this are supporting mechanisms such as learning and 
communication. This seems plausible, since there can be no knowledge creation and exchange 
without communication (cf. Schreyögg/Geiger 2007). Therefore, a fourth proposition can now 
be stated. 
Proposition 4: Rail businesses recognize the strategic value of crisis knowledge and 
therefore, emphasize the generation of such through training, communication and learning 
cycles. 
Together, these four propositions should form the basis for answering the research question. 
These will now be translated into concepts that can be elicited in practice via questions in an 
interview situation. 
3.3 Operationalization of propositions 
In general, stated propositions in a work of research cannot be measured. They need to be 
transferred to a set of facts that can be extracted from reality (cf. Mayer 2008, 72f.). The task 
is to break them down into several sub-parts to which a respondent can make comments. 
When we turn to the first proposition, which is that terrorism is supposed to be an 
acknowledged threat to rail business, it might be possible to distinguish two perspectives. The 
former perspective elicits whether a company thinks it constitutes a likely target, the latter 
perspective relates to the perceptions of customers a company relies on to demand its services. 
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Building a picture from those two viewpoints about the terrorist threat should be useful in 
assessing proposition 1. 
Proposition 2 locates the relevance of terrorism on a strategic level. Triggering response 
directly to such a statement may result in bias due to the anticipation of a supposedly socially 
desirable answer. Therefore, looking more closely at the meaning of ‘strategic’ in this context, 
offers some further possible reference points. Strategic thinking is preoccupied with a long-
term time horizon, leading to an elicitation of the duration of relevance of terrorism in our 
cases. Strategic decision-making also most often involves upper management levels; 
therefore, the location of organizational responsibility may support a proper assessment of 
proposition 2. 
Proposition 3, which relates to the existence and structure of crisis management plans, already 
entails by its nature the various aspects and phases of crisis management and can be addressed 
in several open questions relating to measures undertaken in the respective companies. The 
final proposition emphasizes a hypothesized importance of crisis knowledge creation and may 
be elicited in conjunction with questions relating to proposition 3. A brief table summarizes 
the above elaborations more vividly. 
Propositions Operationalization 
(1) Terrorism is an acknowledged threat 
to rail business. 
 External (customer perspective) and
internal (interviewee) perception of
terrorist threat
(2) Rail businesses will consider this 
threat to be of strategic relevance. 
 External (customer behavior) and
internal (interviewee) perception of
duration of problem relevance
 Locus of organizational
responsibility
 Competitive situation with regard to
crisis management
(3) Rail businesses draw upon crisis 
management plans, which consist of 
separate actions that broadly follow a 
concept of planning, implementation 
and feedback. 
 Depiction of crisis management
components and processes
(4) Rail businesses recognize the strategic 
value of crisis knowledge and 
therefore, emphasize the generation of 
such through training, communication 
and learning cycles. 
 Relevance attributed to these
specific parts
Table 3: Operationalization of propositions. 
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The following subchapter deals with the process of gathering the empirical information. 
3.4 Data collection 
When collecting empirical data, sample selection is always a crucial issue (cf. Mayer 2008, 
38ff.). It determines to what extent generalizable statements about reality can be justified. 
This work has chosen a specific focus on the German rail travel industry. Since choosing a 
basic population encompassing all German rail travel companies does not seem feasible, this 
work has decided to contact the leading seven rail travel corporations in Germany (cf. Doll 
2011). Taken together, they cover almost all of the German rail transport market (cf. Holzhey 
et al. 2011) and therefore, seem to be a reasonable choice in order to offer a realistic account 
on the research topic. It was also hypothesized that these firms were large and important 
enough to have the need as well as the resources for elaborated crisis management 
capabilities. 
The first contact round was administered by sending out letters to the firms’ crisis 
management professionals, in case contact details were publicly available, or to general 
management. For the latter situation, assistance in contacting respective company experts was 
kindly requested. The companies not having replied to the first correspondence were 
contacted a second time via e-mail or phone calls. In the end, it was possible to gain the 
support of six companies, which is gratefully acknowledged. Together, these form 86% of the 
base sample and almost 100% of the German rail market, respectively. A total of five 
interviews were conducted, paying respect to the fact that some companies were joint 
ventures of two different rail travel corporations comprised in the base sample. Apart from 
one interview, where two interviewees were involved, all interviews took part with one 
interviewee. The interviews were conducted in German. Afterwards, the relevant quotes 
presented in the data analysis section were translated into English. 
A final word should be said about ethical considerations. Writing about terror related issues is 
a sensitive undertaking. By presenting research information about possible countermeasures, 
one inadvertently increases the vulnerability of targets. However, it may be argued, that the 
benefit gained by a deeper understanding of the topic will offset this risk. Furthermore, 
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anonymity was provided for all interviewees and entities involved in the research process at 
all times. Cooperation was voluntary and followed the standard rules of informed consent. 
After having explicated the relevant issues of this work’s research design, the following 
chapter shall continue to present the results that have been discovered in undertaking the 
empirical part of this work. 
4 Data Presentation and Analysis 
Conducting interviews for this kind of work produces a large quantity of verbal data, which 
creates the need to use the method of qualitative content analysis to extract and organize its 
relevant content. The transcribed interview texts were scanned according to several research 
criteria, which follow the four stated research proposition. Information relating to the 
propositions were extracted from the interview data and ordered along these main categories. 
This structured information is then used to assess the research propositions. The depiction 
below illustrates the method. 
Figure 7: Schematic concept of qualitative content analysis. Source: Based on Gläser/Laudel (2010, 
200). 
Therefore, the findings shall now be discussed according to the research propositions. 
Proposition 1: Terrorism is an acknowledged threat to rail business. 
As the first proposition suggests, it is expected that the respective companies realize they are 
in fact a target for terrorist activities. This view could have been suspected since attacks on 
transportation systems had taken place in the past in London and Madrid, for example. It was 
mentioned in the interviews, that former incidents did indeed show a relevance of the terrorist 
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topic. However, as no fatal bombing has taken place in Germany until today, the sense of 
urgency might not be as present. This is something that was mentioned consistently, 
particularly when it came to customers’ perceptions. As one interviewee put it, 
“Well, I think that the broad mass in public actually feels quite safe in Germany. In a 
sense that they don’t immediately deal with the potential to have a threat situation on a 
daily basis.” 
However, there may be regional differences. The interviews revealed the opinion that it is 
most likely busy, visible places that can become targets of an attack. Travelers in metropolitan 
regions seem to be more concerned, especially if a recent awareness campaign or heightened 
security presence had just taken place. For instance, 
“[e]specially elder customer, they experience that quite differently. Maybe they’ve seen 
times of war, now [the police] are running around with a gun, and what’s going on there 
right now?” 
Even though the current threat level may not be on high alert, the awareness for the general 
exposure of rail companies as part of an open transportation system exists. They consider 
themselves a ‘soft target’ and are conscious of the fact that terrorists may want to target rail-
related infrastructure and passengers just as any other part of an open society where victims 
and attention-catching media can be created. One professional describes this underlying risk 
in the following statement. 
“It’s actually a coincidence that nothing of the sort has happened so far in our place. […] 
We’re in Afghanistan just as well, so ultimately, we’re in the same danger.” 
Seeing that the companies do not only recognize the issue of terrorism, but also realize their 
specific exposure, this provides proof for the first hypowork. No one expressed that terrorism 
is exclusively relevant to other industries, e.g. aviation, nor that is has become obsolete for 
any reason. Therefore, the first hypowork can be supported by the findings. 
Once general awareness is established to be linked to the rail industry, it is then appropriate to 
inquire about the perception of the severity of the terrorism threat. In order to judge about the 
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relative importance of the terrorist threat for rail business, it is necessary to proceed to the 
second proposition. 
Proposition 2: Rail businesses will consider this threat to be of strategic relevance. 
The relative importance of the terrorist threat may be visible through various aspects. For one, 
businesses need their customers’ long-term support. Therefore, the question can be asked as to 
what extent can terrorism impair this relationship? It could be hypothesized that customers 
will avoid rail travel, which would then lead to revenue losses. The interviewed experts’ 
viewpoint related any possible demand slumps to a rather short-lived time horizon. As one 
interviewee explained, 
„ […] the experience until now is, Paris or Madrid or the like, too, people are traveling 
again. Because, firstly, many don’t have any other choice and secondly, it’s in relation to 
the risk to have an accident on the street and so forth, well, life is always risky. I don’t 
think there will really be any lasting reductions in demand.” 
It was also noted that other ways of travel do not constitute perfect substitutes, since flying 
can be seen as at least as risky in terms of terror-relatedness, and cars may induce expenses 
that not everyone may be able to support compared to the costs incurred by public transport 
commuting. Besides, competing with other means of transport is a phenomenon, which is part 
of the basic everyday business and not expected to aggravate in the case of an incident or a 
heightened threat level. Moreover, an overly negative reference to a certain provider is not 
expected. 
“And I don’t think, well, as a consequence it won’t lead to someone saying, we’re now 
going to avoid (the specific company) or the like.” 
Deeming a customer impact to be of a rather temporary nature does not mean, however, that 
the interviewees deny an influence on customers outright. This becomes visible in the 
following exemplary statement. 
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“[…] the customer who is directly affected by such a crisis, I’d say you won’t satisfy him 
again in the next ten to fifteen minutes or within the next couples of days, because he is 
affected, and that is immediately going to influence his opinion […]” 
If a profound strategic business risk does not originate from the customer side, however, it 
may be worth looking towards the competitive side of the rail travel industry. It was already 
conjectured further above in this work, that traditional competitive thinking in terms of 
outpacing hostile business rivals may not be applicable in this case since security is a good 
that benefits all. In fact, it was even found that there is a decent amount of cooperation taking 
place in this respect, mirrored by the two quotes below. 
“And one should put that aside to say, alright, we’re usually kind of competitors, but look, 
we’re all operating together on a public infrastructure and in case there’s an incident on 
our train, it could be you’re on the adjacent track and I say, if there’s some bigger incident, 
a bomb would explode, let’s make the absolute worst case, it could well be your train is 
affected just as well, so let’s deal with this together.” 
“Competition takes place during the bidding and apart from that, the transportation 
companies are working together […] There are no fundamental differences regarding this 
issue.” 
This collaboration can take different forms, ranging from joint participation in associations 
and working groups over conferences and scenario exercises with local, state and federal 
police to communication channels between the respective companies. These collaborative 
efforts will also be of importance in the further course of this analysis as we later pass on to 
the following propositions. Moreover, they are not restricted to purely preventive activities. 
Mutual support in the case of a concrete event has also been touched upon in the interviews. 
Any rail participant will be integrated in the case of an incident since security actions do not 
stop at the border of a certain company. One past example was referred to where an employee 
care system was provided for conjoint benefit. 
Hence, strategic relevance does not quite seem to arise from competition in this specific case, 
either. However, it was also elicited which management levels are in charge of dealing with 
the issue of terrorism. Here, the answers diverged. For example, General Management, 
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Security CEO or Rail Operations Manager were featured in the replies. It also became clear 
that operative personnel play a central role. Employees in charge of security on site or 
conductors are those who are the very first to experience and respond to a threat or attack. 
Therefore, they have great value and expectations placed on them. Only in response to that 
can higher management levels process the incoming information and act vis-à-vis the public 
and media. These answers point to multiple levels of responsibility, instead of an exclusive 
upper echelon importance. This, however, does not contradict a strategic relevance at all, 
since strategic relevance is not characterized by exclusivity. It could be expected that different 
layers inside a company are involved with activities relating to terrorism, including existing 
awareness of senior executives. 
Moving further from the possible reasons for strategic relevance presumed so far, risks 
originating from terror can also entail hazards for a company’s bottom line. In conducting the 
interviews, it was contended that any rail company is a commercial enterprise; therefore, a 
crisis will have an effect in the first place. However, 
“the risk is not measured in draining customer flows, no, nor in sales not being ensured 
anymore […] the risk is rather in the area of damage and effects, delays or the like or rail 
traffic can’t be guaranteed for a certain period of time and because of that, we will lose 
passengers during that period of time and with that naturally revenue losses as well […]” 
As seen, disruption of operations is what more concern may be placed on. This could 
probably hint at a different focus in operationalizing strategic relevance. Companies do see 
that a terror incident can evoke a crisis, it is therefore taken seriously, but overall, there is 
great confidence that such a crisis will be mastered in the long-term. 
Taking the above results into account, the response to the second proposition appears 
somewhat mixed. 
“[…] there is a crisis management, yes, but, the area of terrorism is rather subliminal there 
[…] one rather concentrates on more comprehensive issues, severe accident scenarios, 
pandemics, in that direction.” 
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Even though terrorism plays a role for the respective companies, it seems to mingle in into a 
greater collection of company threats. It has nonetheless been identified as a topic belonging 
to everyday business. Because of that relevance for sustainable and lasting company 
operations it can be fitted into a longer-term, and therefore, strategic time-horizon. Yet, a shift 
towards a stronger operational preoccupation might be discernible. Following this, the second 
proposition can only be partially supported. 
Moving on to specific actions that rail businesses can undertake in order to respond to the 
terror threat, proposition three will now be assessed according to the interview feedback. 
Proposition 3: Rail businesses draw upon crisis management plans, which consist of 
separate actions that broadly follow a concept of planning, implementation and feedback. 
Several sources were examined in the earlier part of this work, both from the academic 
literature as well as from practice. They concur insofar as they portray the crisis management 
process broadly by three main activity categories. It was intended to elicit whether these 
findings were applicable to the German rail travel industry. 
The reactions of the respondents all displayed activities relating to all main categories. 
Referring to preceding steps belonging to the realm of planning like information collection 
and evaluation, contingency planning and exercises, these were all mentioned in the 
interviews. Companies place a lot of emphasis and value on the qualification of their 
personnel and conduct in-house trainings. The same holds true for informative and/or 
preventive collaboration with external partners that was already mentioned further above. 
Whether these activities take place on a more ad-hoc basis or on regular terms depends, for 
instance, on their regional scope, especially when external partners are involved. 
Notwithstanding their varying frequency, their occurrence was consistently voiced. 
“[…] we have periodic intervals with the police […] we do a lot in form of seizure 
exercises, evacuation exercises […] this is a continuous business, which makes it easier 
for both parties […]” 
This indication towards the ongoing nature of this crisis management preparation also points 
to the flexibility and the constant evaluation, which is taking place throughout the crisis 
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management process. The theory suggests that a certain flexibility and re-evaluation of all 
parts of the stages is advisable. This is found in the present survey as well. 
“Based on the planning meetings you already see in most of the cases, if a process, 
perhaps, is not that optimal anymore because certain things have changed. Those things 
will be recorded, analyzed, evaluated […]” 
In case there is a real event that needs to be responded to, companies feel well prepared, as far 
as preparation for such an incident can go. It was stated that no event is like the other and 
therefore, flexibility again plays a key role. Although there are several plans, preparative 
handouts or outlines according to which threat one needs to respond to, the certain rigidness 
that they incorporate is not believed to be supportive if quick and determined actions are 
needed. Therefore, interviewees again place emphasis on the qualification and empowerment 
of personnel on site in the acute phase as well as on teamwork, indicating a people-centered 
perspective. 
“Now, there are certain manuals, action manuals I’d say, for such cases. However, this is 
rather rigid, this system, in fact. So, as a principle we’re trying to ease that a bit in a sense 
that someone who is on site has to take a decision […] And essentially we’ve asked 
ourselves, it is dependent on the situation of the individual who says, I’ve now found a 
suspicious item.” 
The acknowledgement of a certain firmness of pre-planned procedures should not, however, 
be misunderstood as a dismissal of these plans, since their significance for clear 
responsibilities and notification processes has been documented in the interviews as well. This 
line of thought can be connected to a reasoning already presented earlier on in this work. An 
inflexible sequence of tasks is not what characterizes crisis management. Crisis management 
is rather characterized by a certain bundle of different activities with varying relevance over 
the development phases of a crisis. 
During an acute crisis containment phase, material arrangements have to be tackled as well, 
for instance, when it comes to the provision of lost capacity or the care for victims. In that 
case, collaborations with external partners again proves to be vital. These actors include many 
parties relevant in an incident, such as police, bomb disposal squads, rescue teams or service 
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providers supporting the continuation of operations. One interview partner gives an example 
of the latter. 
“And there, you need to make sure that through the respective emergency plans […] 
operations can be immediately maintained and customers can still be transported […] We 
have relatively good relations, especially when it comes to rail replacement services, 
which are established relatively quickly. There, we have good ties to bus companies […]” 
Another key component in the course of the implementation according to the work’ preceding 
lines of thought was also identified in the present investigation. The element considered is the 
role of communication. It was voiced consistently as an integral part of crisis management. 
The relevance of media relations and media impact on customers are acknowledged 
comprehensively. 
“Parallel to that, we have here regionally, of course, yeah, I’ll call it press mailing list. 
Press contacts. You have here, of course, the regional media, but also nationwide stable 
contact persons, stable editors. There, as well, ongoing contact, ongoing maintenance of 
contacts is really relevant.” 
“[…] it pays to have competent leaders, who know how to deal with the media, that you 
really have such an air of calmness, integrity, communicate clearly what the company is 
doing, that the company is prepared for that, in order to still give passengers confidence 
[…]” 
More thorough evaluation processes are expected to commence as soon as the severest part of 
an incident concludes. Participating firms, too, touched upon this last phase. 
“Of course such incidents will be taken as an occasion to look at the respective 
standardized procedures. What had worked, where could it possibly be improved, etc., 
planning, sure.” 
“And for us, internally, I can only say I think we would learn from it and draw our 
conclusions and simply deal with it in a self-critical way as well.” 
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Since learning cycles, either throughout or subsequent to processes, feedback their 
experiences and results to improve any further plans for future actions against threats, they are 
of special importance to knowledge creation. Knowledge, its creation and use has already 
been documented as the pivotal cause for competitiveness and strategic survival of a firm in a 
market in the theoretical part of this work. The last proposition incorporates this significance 
and wants to stimulate reactions from practice to this matter. Therefore, the emphasis will 
soon be put on the subject of knowledge and the issues integral to it such as learning, training 
and communication. 
Before that, a concluding assessment of the appropriateness of the third proposition has to be 
given. The interviews revealed answers pertaining to all three main crisis management 
categories. Preventive efforts were frequently cited, such as a focus on qualification, 
information gathering or test runs evaluating the functioning of plans and communication 
channels. Statements relating to acute implementation actions also occurred, encompassing, 
amongst others, the attendance to continuing operations or the media. Feedback activities 
were important, as well. Here, it is interesting to note that the interview participants have 
stressed the continuous character of new information and learning, which therefore, also 
points to the flexible nature of crisis management. In line with this, the participants deemed a 
too rigid planning approach inappropriate since every crisis’ individual development asks for 
varying foci regarding the choice and relevance of specific actions. 
There was no information, which considerably altered the content, or composition of crisis 
management functions as it had been detailed in the theoretical part of this work. Overall, the 
description of the interviewed experts’ coincided very well with this work’s expectation. It 
shows that the prevailing understanding of crisis management in the literature can also be 
found in the specific practical example of the German rail travel industry. Therefore, the third 
proposition can be supported by the findings. 
With this, the work shall proceed to assessing the fourth and last proposition. 
Proposition 4: Rail businesses recognize the strategic value of crisis knowledge and 
therefore, emphasize the generation of such through training, communication and learning 
cycles. 
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The last proposition is related to the role of enterprise knowledge in managing terrorist threats 
against businesses. Such knowledge has been hypothesized to play a central role in addressing 
the terrorist threat. Reasons for that have been grounded in both the management literature 
coming from the knowledge-based view of economic success as well as from counter-
terrorism industry practice existent so far. 
Knowledge creation and access can cover elements such as fostering communications, 
undertaking trainings and support learning cycles inside and outside a firm. In the course of 
assessing the fourth proposition, we shall elicit if knowledge is indeed central to the 
participating firms and which forms this knowledge handling takes in practice. During the 
assessment of the previous propositions, it was already sounded that learning and knowledge 
handling is a natural element of rail businesses’ crisis management process. Now, in attending 
to it specifically, this can become even clearer. 
The interviews pointed to the criticalness of information and knowledge in order to deal with 
terrorist threats properly. Without accurate information, it is very difficult if not nearly 
impossible to undertake relevant processes in a suitable manner. Participants’ answers 
highlighted knowledge and information to be in fact the decisive factor. 
“[…] you really have to put it that way, without this information it would be very, very 
difficult to stay up to date and to initiate the respective measures inside the firm.” 
As it was already voiced further above during the reflections on the preceding propositions, 
the dissemination of the relevant knowledge needs a lot of effort in pursuing constant 
communication with the respective partners, be it with security forces, working groups or 
other intra-industry enterprises. As one company expert put it, 
“[i]t is important to stay with the topic, it is important to pursue communication with the 
participants […] You can spare yourself a lot of […] work, if you just have that 
communication and have it on a relatively regular basis […] And I think that is the 
approach you should pursue, this bonding and this network, which has now developed, to 
maintain that […]” 
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Concluding from this, one can already spot the appreciation firms show for the value of crisis 
knowledge and the relevance of communication relating to it. A slight distinction was 
discernible in the interviews depending on how they judged the quality of knowledge 
collaboration. Some voiced possible room for improvement with certain actors, while the 
overall tenor, in general, was very positive. Another small particularity still worth mentioning 
relates to the frequency and centrality of knowledge handling. Depending on which 
cooperation partner or working group was referred to, frequency of interaction was bound to 
vary, however, without substantially influencing the importance attributed to the knowledge 
sharing efforts. Variations were also possible in conjunction with the departments or level of 
responsibility at which knowledge handling was ultimately situated, again without distinctive 
alterations in significance ascribed to crisis knowledge. 
Transferring the efforts of communication to other areas where additional partners play a role, 
the media was again brought into this field in the interviews. The utmost importance of a 
continuity of work is expressed again, underlining the interconnection between all the stages 
of crisis management. In relation to these communication processes, one interview partner 
pronounced the following. 
“And that, again, is a continuous process, […] you have to talk to the media, you shouldn’t 
keep a low profile […] That means essentially, you can only achieve good public relations 
if you’re open, if you’re transparent, if you try to inform in a very timely manner.” 
Customers also belong to the realm of communication and public relations. They do in fact 
receive news relating to a company from media sources, but still, they come into direct 
contact with a firm. This was touched upon in the interviews in various forms, since customer 
communication can take place during different process stages. While interviewees voiced the 
significance of transparency, they also noted that not every communication is intended to flow 
outside of the firm for security reasons. In addition, communicative action with the aim of 
building customers’ trust and security feeling was mentioned, but in a restrictive way, for too 
much police presence or awareness building might also result in counterproductive 
psychological outcomes. One interview partner stated, 
“[w]ell, we’ve had the experience that a customer actually feels insecure if he sees 
something like that […] So we’re really very sensitive with such measures.” 
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Overall, the interviews revealed a notable appreciation for information and communication 
efforts. Their value can be deduced from the relative weight attributed to them, but has also 
been explicated more obviously similar to the assertion of the quote below. 
“Yeah, central insights are of course that you specifically have to work on communication 
processes and notification processes. […] That is the focus.” 
So far, the elaborations have covered several parties concerned, while still waiting for more 
attention towards an internal perspective and an employee focus. Indeed, what came through 
during the course of the interviews, as well, was again a people-centered focus of the 
subsequent learning and feedback activities. As it had already been described in prior stages, 
employees are of considerable value to the respective companies in crisis situations. This also 
seems natural in light of the fact that theory also locates knowledge capabilities at the level of 
the individual. Especially, when it comes to a feedback stage, it was voiced that it is important 
to strengthen employees and let them feel the company’s concern. Since a crisis situation is 
always a straining situation to them, internal communications play a vital role. One interview 
explained that circumstance in the following sense. 
“[…] it is highly important to have a certain social competence, as well, and a social 
network within (the company), which we do build with the respective aides that benefit 
these employees in the aftermath. […] We offer our employees a lot through our social 
network and if an employee knows that, of course he will approach such a crisis coping 
differently compared to if he knows I’ll be left alone as soon as I’m going home today.” 
Social competences and leadership competences were introduced as a precondition to 
sustaining employee spirit. It was also mentioned that giving feedback and praising employee 
behavior after an incident is important. It shows them that the organization is standing behind 
them and is taking them seriously. This may then again feedback, or feed forward, if you so 
will, to the next prevention phase, since crisis management is a circular endeavor in that 
sense. It also highlights that the topic of knowledge is not exclusive to an immediate post-
incident phase. This seamless and smooth blending may be drawn from the exemplary 
comment below. 
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“I think to make it clear to staff that as the company, you are standing behind them in the 
first place regardless of what’s happening. That they can in fact expect help and ask for 
that help, too. If they already have questions, well, I’m relating to the topic of prevention 
[…] so that [the employee] is simply putting that question on the table.” 
This brings us back to actions that relate to knowledge building and assessment through 
preventive efforts, which were previously discussed. When it came to specifically addressing 
the value of knowledge in the course of the interviews, these topics were revisited and 
emphasized, thus constituting a first reasonable evidence for the fourth proposition. With 
regard to elements in this area, careful selection of employees, good training and exercises 
were illustrated as possible examples of knowledge creating measures, just as it was 
hypothesized. Cooperative efforts outside the firm, which were exemplified early in this 
interview data analysis, were even taken on an international network scale by one participant. 
“There is an international European network of corporate security departments and rail 
police […] it is part of that to take a look at how others design their processes and the like, 
so you can incorporate issues that are relevant for you […] and check what can be 
improved, what has to be adjusted etc.” 
This displays once more that learning is a vital part of the efforts undertaken by the German 
rail travel companies and that this learning is also done by pulling knowledge from outside 
sources. 
All these efforts have one final goal: To inhibit or reduce negative consequences arising from 
terrorism. Only then, have crisis management and in connection with the last proposition, 
knowledge and learning, achieved their objective. This ultimate relevance of knowledge 
underlying crisis management affects the robustness and resilience of firms in coping with 
terrorist threats. The role they attribute and the way they deal with learning determines how 
they come out of crises in the long-term. This insight has been presented in the interviews and 
is displayed by the subsequent explanations. 
“What we have to improve, I think, ‘you should put your own house in order first’, as they 
say. And then to say, that won’t happen to us again next time.” 
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“You’ve learned from it, it is of course a very bitter experience […] But I think you 
always come out stronger, because as the saying goes, experience and also bad experience 
is the most bitter opportunity to learn, but you learn more through that and draw lessons 
for the future from these incidents, that’s just how it is.” 
Based on these findings, it has become obvious that respondents attribute great value to 
knowledge activities, be it internal or external communication, training and exercise efforts 
with various partners or learning and feedback processes after an incident as well as flexibly 
throughout the whole crisis management process wherever necessary. As a result, the last 
proposition is supported by the presented data. 
After this ample analysis of the research propositions, a final conclusion of this work shall 
now be given in the last chapter. 
5 Conclusion 
This research’s main motivation was to shed light on the relationship between terrorism and 
its influence on business activities. Terrorism, specifically its Islamist form, has hit Western 
nations with an unprecedented force by the attacks of 9/11 and has not abated since then, with 
bombings following in places like London or Madrid. Apart from its relevance to political 
science, the impact terrorism can have on the economy and on enterprises has become of 
concern to studies in economic and managerial science. Its impacts are not constrained to 
damage on property and people in the aftermath on an attack, but also encompass 
psychological effects in society as a result of heightened security levels. Furthermore, the 
impacts on businesses do not merely belong to the area of collateral damage; businesses are in 
fact an explicit target of terrorist activities. 
This work wanted to pay respect to that fact and analyze how businesses deal with their 
responsibility to address and counter the terrorist threat that they are facing. Such efforts are 
generally situated in the broader ambit of crisis management. Several studies have attended to 
crisis management in conjunction with terror threats, for instance with relation to the tourism 
sector (cf. Aschauer 2008; Henderson 2008; Sullivan-Taylor/Wilson 2009). However, not 
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much scientific work has been undertaken with regard to the rail travel industry, even though 
public transport has been targeted in the attacks of London or Madrid, for example. This work 
wanted to fill this research gap and focus on the approach towards terror issues in this 
industry in Germany through conducting interviews with experts from the industry’s main 
players. 
Furthermore, it was intended to bridge the gap between crisis management and strategic 
thinking, which is identified in the literature. Since terrorism is an issue, which will most 
probably be relevant to business for many years to come, taking a longer-term strategic view 
seemed advisable. 
In attempting to achieve this, the work proceeded by presenting core concepts critical to this 
work, such as terrorism and crisis management, and narrowed them down to this work’s 
specific focus. Following, the link towards strategy was established and presented a strategic 
framework of crisis management to be applied in the research. These elaborations then 
provided the basis for presenting and assessing the research propositions. 
The research propositions were built on the overarching main research question of this work: 
How is crisis management as an answer to terrorist threats structured in German rail travel 
companies? 
Drawing on this foundation, it was proposed that as a first step enterprises need to realize their 
exposure before any actions would be embarked upon. This might have been taken for 
granted, but since this work’s interest was to cover a specific industry’s focus, it seemed 
advisable not to transfer other industry’s findings as self-evidently applying to any other case. 
It was then found that the German rail travel industry recognizes their relevance as a target to 
terrorist activities, while not currently on high alert. Next, it was proposed that the terrorist 
threat would be of strategic importance to them. Here, the results were mixed. Several layers 
of responsibility inside a firm seem to be preoccupied with the threat of terrorism, and even 
though senior management levels belong to these, the topic rather mingles in into various 
different challenges that rail businesses face on a daily basis. Nevertheless, it was found that 
all of them already have developed approaches and crisis management plans on how to deal 
with this issue. Their answers portrayed the suspected model of planning, implementation and 
evaluation. Participants addressed crisis management measures relating to all three phases. 
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Finally, it was hypothesized that while presenting their crisis management efforts participants 
would place an emphasis on communication, training and learning features, thus coinciding 
with the value of knowledge defined in strategic management research. This was discovered 
in the answers of the participants who stressed the importance of crisis knowledge through 
external collaboration, employee training and communication within and outside the firm 
throughout all stages of the process. 
Based on this, the overall research question of how German rail travel companies structure 
their crisis management has found a sound answer that showed considerable commonalities 
across the participants and matched almost all of the supposed propositions in a 
comprehensive manner. 
Via carrying out the literature analysis, this work concluded that there is a need for a stronger 
consolidation of the research areas of crisis management and strategic management (cf. 
Pearson/Clair 1998, 59; Ritchie 2009). The present work drew on prior authors’ foundations 
to elaborate more profoundly on the congruence that exits between the main elements of both 
approaches. It was found that the structure of their processes bear similarity to each other, for 
both follow a composition of planning, execution and evaluation. Through contrasting the 
relevant academic background of both research spheres, the provision of a well-founded 
synthesis was envisaged. This intention concluded in presenting an integrated framework of 
strategic crisis management, adapted from the work of Ritchie (2004). 
Apart from this, literature called for further work investigating various different industries in 
terms of crisis management, public rail transport being one of them (cf. Fowler et al. 2007, 
100). This work has answered to that call in attending to the specific example of the German 
rail travel industry, since there was a lack of research in this area, even though public 
transport is known as a possible soft target exposed to terror attacks. This work provided 
genuine work in this area and addressed the existing gap. It was found that the elaborations on 
crisis management were very well in line with what crisis management experts from the 
participating companies revealed. By having covered a most significant part of the German 
rail travel market, this work claims to provide a novel and comprehensive statement about the 
structure of crisis management efforts in the German rail travel industry. 
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The implications of this work for practice are manifold. Amongst others, they lie in the fact 
that an exclusive overview of the latest situation of crisis management in the German rail 
travel industry has been given based on inside information gratefully received from 
participating partners. Companies may see this as a reassurance and positive reinforcement of 
their practices. They may also capitalize on this overall industry-wide assessment for their 
own crisis management procedures. Furthermore, this work may function as a stimulus across 
all industries in order to rethink or refine processes that ultimately target at enhancing 
business resilience. Increasing resilience against terrorism with the goal to minimize all 
classes of damage that can be done is in fact the final goal of any research situated in the area 
of strategic crisis management. 
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